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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900021-CA
Priority No. 2

ROBERT T. HASTON,
Appellant/Petitioner,

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Petitioner Robert T. Haston files this petition for
rehearing.

In Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912),

the Utah Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a
petition:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper
cases. When this court, however, has considered and
decided all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we have
based the decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . .
If there are some
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing should
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its form
will in no case be scrutinized by this court.
129 P. at 624.

This petition for rehearing meets the preceding

standards and should be granted for the substantive reasons
discussed below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 6, 1991, this Court affirmed the trial court's
conviction of Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner Robert T. Haston for
Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-4-102(2), and 76-5-203.

The Court of

Appeals decision is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this petition, no factual statements are
necessary.

This petition addresses only a question of law.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Attempted depraved indifference murder is not a crime
because it requires that a defendant intend to commit an unintended
killing.

Finding it to be a logical impossibility, other

jurisdictions have ruled that since such a "crime11 could not exist,
the underlying conviction must be reversed.

A similar disposition

is required here.
ARGUMENT
POINT
SINCE ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER IS A
LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY, PETITIONERS CONVICTION
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
In State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174 (N.M. App. 1985), the
court raised, sua sponte, the question of whether a crime exists for
attempted depraved mind murder.
exist, the court reasoned:

Holding that such a crime could not

"in order to convict for attempted

- 2

-

depraved mind murder the jury would have to find defendant intended
to perpetrate an unintentional killing."

Id. at 1178.

The court

stressed the impossibility of this result and ultimately reversed
the defendants convictions.
As noted previously in Mr. Haston's letter of supplemental
authority, this very issue is now before the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Vigil, Case No. 900166 (Utah to be argued orally June 11,
1991) .
n.9.

See Addendum B; cjf. Appellant Haston's opening brief at 26

Mr. Vigil and the State have both filed their respective

briefs, with oral argument scheduled for June 11, 1991.

Rather than

resubmitting the issue and argument to this Court for a duplicative
determination, Mr. Haston respectfully requests this Court to await
the outcome of the Vigil decision before finalizing Mr. Haston's
conviction.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner Haston requests a rehearing by this Court on
whether Attempted Criminal Homicide, as defined by the "depraved
indifference" instruction, is a crime.

In addition, Mr. Haston also

requests a stay of the remittitur for his case.
SUBMITTED this >^J

day of May, 1991,

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATION
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, do hereby certify the following:
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this case;
(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay disposition of this
matter.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this d~0

day of May, 1991.

£•
INALD S. FUJBNO
RONALD
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this J2£)

day of May, 1991.

S.&T
Ronald S. Fujirio

DELIVERED by

this

of May, 1991.
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ADDENDUM A

MAY 61991
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

' T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900021-CA
F I L E D
(May 6, 1991)

Robert T. Haston,
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District/ Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Robert T. Haston appeals his conviction for
attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony. Defendant
also challenges enhancement of his sentence for use of a
firearm and imposition of fines, surcharge, costs, and
restitution. We affirm his conviction but remand for
resentencing.
FACTS
Defendant's companion, David Ezzeddine, had received his
government assistance payment on August 2, 1989. The proceeds
were used to defray the expenses incurred in the course of a
protracted drinking party. Defendant, Ezzeddine, and Leonard
Tate spent approximately two days engaged in nearly non-stop
barhopping and imbibing, joined sporadically by three other
companions. Over the course of this bacchanal, the revelers
consumed a fifth-gallon of peppermint schnapps, several
pitchers of beer, at least 120 cans of beer, and a quantity of
vodka.

On the afternoon of the second day, the festivities having
moved to a motel on Salt Lake City's west side, Ezzeddine asked
defendant to see his gun. Defendant gave Ezzeddine the gun, a
revolver, which was then passed to Tate, and returned to
defendant. Defendant offered a version of subsequent events
which was at odds with the details related by Tate and
Ezzeddine. Defendant claimed to have been loading the gun in
order to be prepared to protect the group from possible
burglars. In contrast, Tate and Ezzeddine claimed defendant
was brandishing the gun while remonstrating Tate for the amount
of beer he had permitted the others to consume. Tate claims
that when he challenged defendant's bravado, defendant shot him.
Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of attempted
criminal homicide, for which he was sentenced to a term of
one-to-fifteen years. The court then enhanced the sentence
with a mandatory one-year term and a discretionary zero-to-five
year term for use of a firearm and ordered the sentences to be
served consecutively. On appeal, defendant challenges the
imposition of two additional prison terms as sentence
enhancement, and contests the imposition of restitution, fine,
surcharge, and costs in the form of attorney fees. Defendant
also claims that jury instructions concerning the burden of
proof were defective, misstating and inadequately explaining
the law, and that the prosecution's misstatement of the law on
the affirmative defense of intoxication was prejudicial.
Finally, he claims the "depraved indifference" instruction was
legally insufficient.
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
Defendant challenges Instruction Number Seven as failing
to adequately define the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and
claims the instruction could have allowed the jury to convict
on an improper civil standard of proof.
We will reverse on the

1.

Instruction Number Seven read:
All presumptions of law, independent
of evidence, are in favor of innocence,
and a defendant is presumed innocent until
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt
as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.

900021-CA
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basis of an improper instruction only where the defendant
demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in
the aggregate. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah
1980) . We review jury instructions in their entirety, State v.
Binaham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984), and will affirm H[w]hen
taken as a whole . . . they fairly tender the case to the jury,
[even where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone,
are not as full or accurate as- they might have been . . . . *
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). See also Cage
v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329 (1990) (HIn construing the
instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have
understood the charge as a whole."); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d
1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (jury instructions must be construed as
a whole).
Defendant relies heavily on Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989),
which was joined in by two other justices and thus is the
opinion of the Court as concerns the reasonable doubt
instruction challenged in that case. Justice Stewart's
opinion, drawn largely from his dissenting opinion in State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989), analyzed specific
language commonly featured in reasonable doubt instructions.

(Footnote 1 continued)
I have heretofore told you that the
burden is upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require proof to an absolute
certainty. Now by a reasonable doubt is
meant a doubt that is based on reason and
one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt
and not a doubt which is merely fanciful
or imaginary or based on a wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to
act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt
is a doubt which reasonable men and women
would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of evidence in
this case.

Two discrete criteria may be distilled from these opinions.
First, as defendant notes, the instruction should contain
terminology which unambiguously expresses the prosecution's
burden to "obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 773 P.2d at
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Johnson, 774 P.2d at
1149 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). That precise
language is contained in Instruction Number Seven. Second, use
of the "weighty affairs of life" language is proscribed. See
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result). Instruction Number Seven omits any reference to
"weighty affairs." The instruction thus conforms with both
prongs of the Johnson/Ireland directive.
la Johnson, the Court instructed trial courts to avoid
jury instructions with language comparing the reasonable doubt
standard with a juror's personal standard in deciding the
"weighty affairs" of his or her life. Xfi- Such language
"tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required
burden-of-proof." Id. (quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). "A jury must have a greater
assurance of the correctness of its decision, if it is to
comply with the constitutional mandate/ than the individual
jurors are likely to have in making the 'weighty* decisions
they confront in their own lives." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
Defendant particularly objects to the inclusion of the
following sentence: "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt." Defendant claims
that this sentence is contextually similar to a phrase rejected
by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Ireland, where the
instruction stated that the jury should convict if it had "an
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge . . . ." Id.
The first portion of the challenged sentence mirrors language
approved in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 572-73 (Utah 1987),
while the remainder of the sentence responds to Justice
Stewart's criticism in Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), and Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the result), by incorporating the "need [to]
obviate a real or substantial doubt" phrase expressed in
Johnson. 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result).
Defendant dissects other portions of Instruction Number
Seven in the course of arguing that the instruction did not
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adequately define the reasonable doubt standard. However,
several sentences now challenged by defendant are identical to
sentences included in the very language of defendant's proposed
instruction. Others are identical or textually similar to
language approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Tillman,
Johnson, and Ireland. We repeat that it is not the province of
an appellate court to peruse each turn of phrase and every
clause of a jury instruction. Rather, in search of prejudicial
error, we consider the instruction in its entirety. Johnson,
774 P.2d at 1146.
The Supreme Court's rejection of the "weighty affairs"
language reflects a concern that analogous language might
permit a defendant to be convicted on a standard of proof lower
than that which is constitutionally required. Johnson, 774
P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). In
essence, Johnson requires trial courts to avoid terms and
phrases which fail to eliminate suggestions that a reasonable
doubt is something more than a "mere possible doubt," although
the Court did not prescribe particular language. See id. at
1148-49.
We have recently held that a reasonable doubt instruction
identical to the instruction challenged in the present case
satisfied the Johnson mandate. See State v. Pedersen, 150 Utah
Adv. Rep. 10, 12-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1 9 9 0 ) . l W h i l e we recognize
that this reasonable doubt instruction is not a model of
lucidity and simplicity,3 it does present an "accurate
2. Defendant cites the recent decision in Cage v. Louisiana,
111 S.Ct. 328 (1990), claiming the reasonable doubt instruction
condemned by the Court is sufficiently similar to the
instruction now under review to merit reversal. We disagree.
The Cage Court focused on phrases equating reasonable doubt
with "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial doubt" and
seemed most troubled by a sentence stating that "moral
certainty" was required rather than something greater. III. at
329. We find no parallel language in Instruction Number Seven.
3. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is a concept not readily
capable of being imparted to a lay jury. Indeed, during our
recent spate of reasonable doubt cases, the position advanced
by appellants has often seemed like an argument that we should
require the substitution of one set of circular legal
mumbo-jumbo for another. This is perhaps one area where a
"plain English" approach may be more helpful to the jury than

definition of the burden-of-proof placed upon the state."4
at 13.5

I£.

(Footnote 3 continued)
intoning grand concepts. It may be more helpful to explain the
burden-of-proof continuum, on the far extreme of which is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. To explain that on a certainty
scale of 0-100, proof by a preponderance of the evidence rates
a 51, clear and convincing about a 70, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt something like a 99 may help a jury to flesh
out just how certain of guilt they must be to convict a
criminal defendant.
The familiar point that a reasonable doubt is a doubt
which has a basis in reason or logic might be developed. It
may be appropriate to suggest that if the jury has no doubt
whatever about defendant's guilt, it must convict. If the
jurors sense some doubt, they must consider its origin. If the
doubt exists because they do not believe the only eyewitness to
the crime could have seen the culprit in the darkness of the
night from the distance acknowledged, they have a reasonable
doubt about defendant's guilt and must acquit unless other
evidence resolves that doubt and satisfies them of his or her
guilt. If their only doubt stems from some amorphous or purely
emotional urge—something like "there's just a feeling I get
when the defendant looks at his mother that makes it hard for
me to imagine he would do such a thing"—then the doubt they
sense, while perceptible, is not a reasonable doubt and they
must convict. ££. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the result) ("Certainly a fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
4. "Omit needless words! Omit needless words! Omit needless
words!" The late emperor of modern grammatical style,
Professor William Strunk, Jr. of Cornell University, so began
each lecture on brevity and clarity. W. Strunk & E.B. White,
The Elements of Style, xiii (3rd ed. 1979). Many American
courts fashioning jury instructions echo his call, see, e.g..
People v. Smith. 77 111. App. 3d 666, 396 N.E.2d 638, 642
(1979); State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49, 785 P.2d 963, 970
(1990); State v. McKensie, 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205, 1219
(1978), vacated on other grounds. 443 U.S. 903 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Sherlock, 326 Pa. Super. 103, 473 A.2d 629, 631
(1984), a group which we unhesitatingly join even though our
own opinions may occasionally suggest a different attitude.
5. Attempting to capitalize on the Johnson and Ireland
opinions, defendant in this case proposed a reasonable doubt

o n n m i _r^A
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PROSECUTORIAL MISSTATEMENT
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated the
law regarding the affirmative defense of intoxication
during his closing argument. The prosecutor stated:
The state suggests that you may find . . .
[defendant] guilty each of three ways, but
any of the three ways is sufficient to
find him guilty. When you read the
instructions, you will note that
voluntary intoxication, Instruction 20,
does not apply at all to the third way
[,]depraved indifference[,] that the
government suggests that [defendant] may
be found guilty. Doesn't matter how drunk
he was. Doesn't matter how drunk people
were that he shot.
The "third way" of showing defendant's guilt required proof
that defendant knowingly did an act with depraved indifference
for life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)(c) (1990); State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 261 (Utah 1988). Thus, intoxication
may be a defense if defendant's intoxication defeated his
capacity to form the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-306 (1990); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). The state concedes that the
prosecutor did indeed misrepresent the law to the jury, but
counters that the error was immediately cured by the judge's
prompt reference to the instructions. Defendant responds that
the instructions themselves were confusing and misleading to
the jury, so that the court's redirection of the jury's
attention to the instructions did not cure the prosecutor's
misstatement.

(Footnote 5 continued)
instruction which would have expressly negated the "weighty
affairs" language. It is doubtful that an effort to define the
reasonable doubt standard by telling the jury what it is not
would be illuminating. In any event, the court rejected
defendant's proffered instruction in favor of Instruction
Number Seven. We need not consider the acceptability of the
instruction rejected by the court since we hold that
Instruction Number Seven adequately comports with the Johnson
criteria. See Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13.

We consider challenges to prosecutorial comments under a
two step analysis. First, we determine whether the remarks
directed jurors' attention to "matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict." State
v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). We next
consider the likelihood that the jury was influenced in its
verdict by the comments. i£. The state agrees the
prosecutor's statement mischaracterized the law regarding
voluntary intoxication as a defense to the element of the
requisite mental state. Hence, the first prong of the test is
satisfied.
Although the trial judge failed to expressly rule on
whether the prosecutor misstated the law, the judge called the
attention of the jury to the written instructions which
addressed the burden of persuasion for an affirmative defense.
The court's response to defense counsel's objection did not
directly contradict the prosecutor or correct his misstatement,
as may have been appropriate. ££. id. (court immediately
corrected prosecutor's misstatement of the law in presence of
the jury). However, implicit in the court's response to the
objection was the assurance that the written instructions, not
the prosecutor's comments, accurately stated the law and should
be the jury's sole referent in considering the affirmative
defense of intoxication. Therefore, our analysis of the second
Lopez prong necessarily reaches the substantive language of the
allegedly curative instructions.
The law of voluntary intoxication as an affirmative
defense was explained in two instructions. Instruction Number
Twenty stated:
Voluntary intoxication is not a
defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the
mental state which is an element of the
offense; however, if recklessness or
criminal negligence establishes an element
of the offense and the actor is unaware of
the risk because of voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is not a
defense.
Instruction Number Twenty-One provided:
You are instructed that the laws of
Utah do not require a defendant to

a

establish intoxication by a preponderance
or greater weight of the evidence. The
laws of Utah require the defendant to
bring forward some substantial evidence
which tends to show intoxication. If the
defendant has done this, and if such
evidence of intoxication when considered
with all other evidence in this case
raises a reasonable doubt as to whether or
not the defendant was able to form the
requisite mental state, then you must
acquit him.
In State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we
stated "[a] defendant's burden concerning any affirmative
defense is quite limited." Id- at 779. See State v.
Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 691 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The
burden remains on the state throughout the trial to prove each
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. At
no point does any segment of that burden shift to the
defendant. Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 779. Once the defendant raises
an affirmative defense, supported by some evidence—whether
introduced by defense or prosecution—the state must refute the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d
211, 215 (Utah 1985). We therefore agree with defendant that
the portion of Instruction Number Twenty-One which "requires
the defendant to bring forward some substantial evidence which
tends to show intoxication" incorrectly states the law, both
because the quantum of evidence required is not "substantial
evidence" and because even the modicum of evidence necessary to
trigger an affirmative defense may come from the prosecution's
case and need not be brought forward by defendant. However, no
prejudice resulted in this case since evidence of defendant's
intoxication was more than*substantial and a good part of that
evidence was indeed brought forward by defendant.6 Thus, while
the instruction contemplated a greater evidentiary burden on
6. The state called several witnesses who testified as to
defendant's extraordinary alcohol consumption and his resulting
demeanor. Defendant also testified as to his state of
intoxication, although he need not have done so in order to
assert an intoxication defense. But see Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215
("defendant may have to assume the burden of producing some
evidence . . . if there is no evidence in the prosecution's
case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation"
for an affirmative defense).

defendant than the law requires to trigger an affirmative
defense, that burden was met in this case.
We do not agree with defendant that the misstatement in
the instruction was of more far-reaching effect, i.e., that it
impermissibly suggested that the burden of persuasion shifted
to defendant to demonstrate that he was too intoxicated to
formulate the requisite intent. We have noted above that we
construe jury instructions as a whole. Johnson, 774 P.2d at
1146. Language unambiguously stating that defendant need not
prove intoxication by even a -preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence" immediately preceded the contested language in
Instruction Number Twenty-One. This instruction also stated
that acquittal was required if there was a reasonable doubt
about whether defendant's intoxication precluded formation of
the requisite mental state. Instruction Number Twenty-One must
also be read in conjunction with Instruction Number Seven,
which advised that the state must prove all elements of the
offense "beyond a reasonable doubt." We believe it unlikely
that the jury understood that any burden of persuasion or proof
had shifted by operation of this instruction.
Our analysis of the second Lopez prong may also include
consideration of the weight of the evidence against defendant.
Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45-46. There was substantial evidence from
which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's
undisputed intoxication was not of such a degree as to vitiate
the necessary mental state. Witnesses testified that
defendant's skills in arithmetic remained intact—he coherently
argued over the amount of beer remaining toward the end of the
drinking party, and who had consumed more than his fair share.
Defendant's own testimony indicated that prior to the shooting,
while he was showing off his revolver, he carefully ensured
that the gun was unloaded before passing it around the room*
He demonstrated an extensive and detailed recall of the events
precluding and surrounding the shooting. Defendant's actions
immediately prior to the shooting, as related by eyewitnesses,
further suggested a man in possession of coordination and
control over his mental faculties. The motel manager testified
that immediately after the shooting, defendant was "nonchalant"
and calm as he attempted to leave the motel premises.
When proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, we do not
presume the challenged comments to be prejudicial. State v.
Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). We find nothing in the
record, and defendant has supplied no citation thereto, which
convinces us of any reasonable likelihood that the jurors were

Q
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influenced by the prosecutor's remarks regarding the
intoxication defense.
We conclude that the second Lopez
prong has not been satisfied and no reversible error resulted
from the prosecutor's misstatement of the law.
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
Instruction Number Eleven required the jury, in
considering the attempted criminal homicide charge, to find
that defendant "act[ed] under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life [and] engaged in conduct
which created a grave risk of death to Leonard Tate . . . ."
Defendant challenges the trial court's rejection of two
explanatory sentences which he sought to add to Instruction
Number Thirteen, which defined "depraved indifference."
Defendant is entitled to instructions which provide
jurors with a clear and meaningful statement of the applicable
law. £&£ State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).
However, the trial court enjoys the discretion to articulate
the law in unadorned and intelligible terms, in order to assist
the jury in its task of weighing the evidence on the scales of
the law. State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988).
The trial court in this case defined -depraved
indifference" as follows:
Depraved indifference refers not to
mental subjective state but to the
objective circumstances under which the
conduct causing the injury occurred.
Reckless conduct which has an incidental
tragic result will not suffice. At the
time of the act, the defendant must know
of the risk. Knowledge here refers to the
nature of the conduct or the circumstances
7. We have noted that the trial court directed the jury to its
instructions rather than the prosecutor's comments for the
correct statement of applicable law. We further note that
defendant did not object at trial to either instruction on
intoxication now claimed to be misleading. Indeed, defendant
does not refute the state's claim that Instruction Number
Twenty-One was defendant's own instruction, offered precisely
as defendant proposed it.

surrounding it or both, but not the result
produced by the conduct. The
circumstances of the injury when
objectively viewed must evidence a
depraved indifference to human life.
Defendant sought to add the following two sentences at the end
of the instruction:
In other words, there must be a knowing
doing of an uncalled-for act in callous
disregard of its likely harmful effect
which is so heinous as to be equivalent to
a "specific intent" to kill. ExampTes of
this might be unmitigated wickedness,
extreme inhumanity or acts of a high
degree of wantonness.
Defendant excerpted the omitted sentences principally
from State v. Bolsinoer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985), and
asserts that similar language was more recently approved in
Standiford. See 769 P.2d at 264. Defendant's proposed
sentences are phrased illustratively, and merely seek to
explain the law enunciated in the instruction as given. The
first sentence simply rephrases the sentence "at the time of
the act, the defendant must know of the risk," albeit in
arguably more vibrant language. The second sentence is equally
emotive, but superfluous. Defendant's basis for inclusion of
this sentence is that identical terminology is found in dicta
in Bolsinaer. See 699 P.2d at 1220. But defendant has no
right to extract favorable rhetoric from any pleasing judicial
dissertation and demand its inclusion in jury instructions.8

8. In a sense, the last sentence proposed by defendant raises
more questions than it answers and thus is not necessarily
helpful in describing "depraved indifference." What is
"wickedness" and when is it "unmitigated?" What is
"inhumanity" and when is it "extreme?" What is "wantonness"
and when has it reached a "high degree?"

i?

In Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the
depraved indifference requirement for a charge of second degree
murder "focuses on the gravity of the risk to human life . . .
and the callousness of attitude toward that risk." 769 P.2d at
262. Standiford was ultimately directed at elucidating the
distinction between a -grave" risk of death and a "substantial
and unjustifiable" risk of death, the latter being the standard
required for the lesser charge of manslaughter. The Court
stated that a trial court must instruct the jury that the
defendant knowingly created a risk of death which he or she
knew to be a grave risk, meaning a highly likely probability of
death, and that the defendant's conduct exhibited an "utter
callousness and indifference toward human life." Standiford,
769 P.2d at 264. The instructions given in the instant case,
while not models of clarity and precision, adequately addressed
those concerns. ££. id- at 264 ("gravity of the risk of death
was not explained with quite the [required] precision . . .
nevertheless . . . we do not believe the jury was misled").
Defendant's proffered supplementary language was surplusage,
with at least some potential to confuse the jury, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing it.
SENTENCING
Defendant's sentence for the charge of attempted criminal
homicide was enhanced for use of a firearm. Additional
consecutive terms of one year and zero-to-five years were
imposed. Defendant challenges the aggregate enhancement period
as potentially exceeding the maximum term of five years. See
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The state
agrees that defendant's sentence is improper on that basis.
Accordingly, the firearms enhancement terms are vacated and the
case is remanded for such resentencing as will alleviate this
concern.
Defendant also challenges the order of restitution,
fines, surcharge, and attorney fees. The court is required to
order restitution to crime victims if it finds that restitution
is not inappropriate after analysis of certain statutory
factors. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1990). While the court
has the discretion to award or deny restitution, State v.
Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987), the judge must state the
reasons for the decision in the trial record. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(3)(b)(i) (1990). Although the statute does not

impose the requirement of full formal findings, a requirement
which would perhaps simplify and expedite appellate review, the
court must declare reasons within the statutory framework for
awarding or denying restitution. A statement in the nature of
findings which adequately apprises a reviewing court of the
trial court's reasoning is minimally required. We are unable
to determine from the record which, if any, of the factors
enunciated in section 76-3-201(3)(b) were considered by the
trial court.
Imposition of a fine, and the accompanying mandatory
surcharge, is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63a-l (1989), 76-3-301.5(5)
(1990). No particular explanation needs to be made by the
trial court.
Costs, including reimbursement for legal defense fees,
may be taxed to the defendant at the court's discretion. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-32a-l (1990). However, the court may not tax
costs if the defendant is or will be unable to pay them. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-32a-3 (1990). Necessarily, the court must
undertake an analysis of the defendant's ability to pay costs
before ordering payment, and must consider the impact of
restitution awards on the defendant's ability to pay. 1&. As
with the matter of restitution, no formal findings are
statutorily mandated, although appellate review becomes more
complicated when the trial court fails to make formal findings,
and becomes impossible when no insight into the court's
rationale is discernible from the record.
Because we have no record before us to demonstrate
compliance with sections 76-3-201(3)(b) and 77-32a-3, we remand
for supplementary findings on the questions of restitution and
responsibility for attorney fees, together with such additional
proceedings as may be necessary to permit the making of adequate
findings.
CONCLUSION
The challenged jury instructions do not require reversal
and defendant's conviction is affirmed. We vacate the firearms
enhancement sentence and the award of restitution and costs and
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remand to the trial court for resentencing and reconsideration
of restitution and costs in accordance with our decision.^

<^%zs*(^ZL
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, ^'Judge

9. We have considered defendant's other arguments and find
them to be without merit and therefore decline to address them
herein. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989)
("Court need not analyze and address in writing each and every
argument, issue or claim raised . . . . " ) ; State v. Jones, 783
P.2d 560, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (court will not engage in
"redundant literary exercise" to treat meritless issues).
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Ms. Mary Noonan
Utah Court of Appeals
4 00 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Noonan:
Re:

State v. Haston
Case No. 900021-CA

Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Robert T. Haston cites the
following supplemental authority in support of his argument that
"attempted depraved murder" is a legal impossibility. See
Appellant Haston's opening brief at 26 n.9.
State v. Vigil, Case No. 900166 (Appellant
Vigil#s opening brief filed January 14, 1991)
(interlocutory appeal questioning whether the
charge of "attempted depraved indifference
homicide" exists).
Respectfully,

tonald S. F u ijim
ro
Ronald
Attorney for Appellant
RSF:kll
Attachment

}

